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}
his article aims to present the discursive processes that were 
used to justify the path chosen to implement the social 
and economic transformation to capitalism in Poland. 
Special attention is paid to the role of elites in shaping  
a public discourse which legitimized the signiicant pauperi-
zation in society and growth of income inequalities as being 
conditioned on individual defects and the “civilizational 
incompetence” of those at the bottom of the social structure. 
hese citizens of Poland were presented as a constraint 
and obstacle to achieving a faster pace of modernization 
processes. his has inluenced the thinking of politicians 
involved in policy-making at the national level, as well 
as the attitudes of those involved in the implementation 
of welfare measures at the local level. Furthermore, it has 
contributed to the unspoken consensus of all mainstream 
political parties over the neoliberal reforms in the economy 
and social policy.






he way of addressing and describing the topic of poverty, exclusion 
and inequality in public debate are important factors which impact 
on the image of the poor in the public eye.1 In the age of tabloidization, 
the attributes attached to poverty in scientiic and political debates are 
“iltered” by the media and become useful and commonly accepted 
clichés used by both the elites and general public, which consequently 
can determine the scale and quality of actions undertaken for the sake 
of the poor. Wim van Oorschot, who studied these interrelations 
and the views on the ‘deservingness’ of various social groups, recalls 
that: “Already in 1908, George Simmel argued in his essay, ‘Der Arme’, 
that the generosity of poor relief generally depends on the degree to which 
the poor are blamed for their own misery” (van Oorschot 2007, 130).
he triumph of the meritocratic approach to social mobility and 
technocratic attitude to policy-making grants a special position to the 
well-educated elite in the process of setting up the public agenda, and 
hence prescribing the legitimacy and importance of certain themes. It is 
also visible that the language and discursive practices used by the most 
prominent and recognized members of the elite via mass-media become 
dominant in the public sphere. his article is aimed at presenting some 
of the speciicities of Polish public discourse during the transition period, 
with special stress put on the role of intellectuals. he paper is structured 
around the following issues:
1. Taking as a reference point the American debate about the ‘underclass’ 
that paved the way for neoliberal reforms in the late seventies 
and the eighties, I argue that similar processes were visible in the public 
discourse in Poland during the transition period.
2. he members of intellectual circles played an important role 
in justifying the neoliberal reforms and providing them with 
intellectual legitimacy. hey, being the “winners of transformation” 
almost unanimously supported the direction and the “technology” 
of implementing economic and social changes. A certain stratum 
of Polish society has been deined as a constraint to achieving 
the economic success and modernization of the country, 
also being perceived as an obstacle to further development 
and modernization.
1   he author wishes to express his gratitude to three anonymous reviewers 
and two well-known editors for their comments and remarks, which helped improve 
the paper.
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3. As the results of the PROFIT project carried out by the sociologists 
from the University of Łódź showed, this kind of discourse 
about transformation has gained signiicant support among 
all those involved in the process of formulating social policy, 
as well as among local elites and persons responsible for the imple-
mentation of social policy measures and the day-to-day functioning 
of welfare services.
4. he dominant discourse has contributed to the ideological chaos 
on Polish political scene, where traditional left-right labels are no longer 
valid descriptions of the stances of main political parties. What’s 
more, while in oice all of them followed the neoliberal path 
of transforming the economy and making policy, which was the only 
one legitimized by the elites.
his paper follows the tradition of critical studies over the discursive 
construction of social issues as presented in the works of Katz, Gans, 
Bauman or Wacquant, who combine their analysis of the discursive 
practices imposed by the elites and intellectuals with the factual, empirical 
veriication of their claims.
It is also inspired by the discourse studies as presented by Teun 
van Dijk (2004, 2006, 2008, 2011) in his works on the discourse 
of power, ideology and inequality. hus, discourse is seen here in a broad 
perspective as an elite-driven communication. he approach of van 
Dijk requires that particular attention be paid to the way social groups, 
their attitudes and opinions are inluenced by the elite-driven discourse, 
which contributes to establishing, shaping and maintaining the social 
relations of power, domination and exploitation. It needs to be underlined 
that this short contribution, combining data from various sources, does not 
aspire to precisely follow the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
nor to contribute substantially to the existing body of theoretical debates. 
his is rather a modest efort to discuss some of the discursive practices 
in context of existing statistics and empirical data produced for the purpose 
of critical research into the Polish public discourse.
Modernization is understood here in rather narrow terms, without 
attempting to add to the long-lasting philosophical debates on its nature 
and meaning. In this paper, it is operationalized according to the most 
common understanding of this concept since the early phase of the post-
-communist transition. From this perspective, modernization refers to 
the process of progressive development towards the standards of Western 
democratic states, and economic transformation into a market-based 
economy according to the principles of the dominant neoliberal creed 
praktyka 3(13)/2014teoretyczna 174
Wojciech Woźniak
(see for example: Grancell, ed. 1995).2 ‘Catch-up modernization’, 
presented as an attempt by the peripheries to move closer to the core 
of the “modern” world was, for many of its proponents, synonymous with 
the neoliberalization of economy and privatization of social relations, 
as well as with radical retrenchment of the state away from large areas 
of social responsibilities. At the same time it was the creative destruction 
of the existing institutional setting and social order, which was supposed 
to bring Poland closer to the imagined Western standards.
he irst two subchapters are intended to introduce a comparative 
element to the debate on the “underclass”, i.e. to present it in an American 
context and in its Polish equivalent, that is the Homo sovieticus debate. 
he subsequent parts constitute the empirical foundation of the paper. 
Excerpts from the works of prominent scholars (particularly by Piotr 
Sztompka) serve here to illustrate the aforementioned elitist and intellectual 
discourse introduced by the ideologists and pacesetters of neoliberal 
modernization.
he approach in this paper is also inspired by decades-old relections 
surrounding the contemporary role and signiicance of social scientists, 
particularly in reference to both their explicit (via political engagement) 
and implicit (via the façade of expert neutrality) involvement in the agenda-
-setting which legitimizes the social order they beneit from. he argument 
here follows the diagnosis of Immanuel Wallerstein, who claimed (1997, 
1250) that the
early hopes of social scientists that they could be modern philosopher-kings 
proved totally vain and social scientists settled into being the handmaidens 
of governmental reformism. When they did this openly, they called it applied 
social science. But for the most part they did this abashedly, asserting that their role 
was merely to do the research, and that it was up to others, the political persons, 
to draw from this research the conclusions that seemed to derive from this 
research. In short, the neutrality of the scholar became the ig-leaf of their 
shame, in having eaten the apple of knowledge.
Underclass under surveillance – the american case
Michael B. Katz (1989), Herbert J. Gans (1995) and Zygmunt Bauman 
(1998) devoted some of their work to elaborate on the American debate 
2   For a brief critical discussion on the topic of “modernization losers” 
in the Polish context see: Czyżewski 2013: 6–8.
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on the “underclass”. his term is sometimes understood as a purely 
descriptive notion, supplementing the existing vocabulary of stratiication 
studies. However, as Zygmunt Bauman claimed in his essay entitled 
“Amazing career of underclass”, there were various indirect semantic 
strategies used by those who contributed to the worldwide recognition 
of that term. He also notices that the discursive and ideological usage 
of this term was very far from what was meant by Gunnar Myrdal 
in his works on the lowest strata of the society: “It is not the members 
of ‘underclass’ who ignore norms of the society; it is society that turns 
its back at them” (Bauman 1998).
Bauman goes on to explore the contemporary meaning of the term, 
which refers to the category of people who are located not at the bottom, 
but outside the social hierarchy, who are unable to ofer anything useful 
to the society, therefore justifying their exclusion. What is fundamental 
to this understanding of the “underclass” is the notion that the becoming 
a member of this category is a matter of individual choice: “purposeful 
and active, or indirect, via omission; it is the choice even when one 
found himself in the underclass, because he failed in his attempts to get 
out of the poverty (which he should – and implicitly – was capable to 
undertake)” (Bauman 1998). Both Bauman and Gans draw attention to 
the crucial role of mass-media in popularizing the new way of describing 
social problems and stigmatizing those at the bottom of the social ladder. 
hey underline the special role of the cover story of TIME magazine 
published on the 29th of August 1979, which impacted on the public 
image of the lowest strata of American society as an alienated, deiant, 
and dangerous minority. Altogether the combination of teens playing 
truants, pimps and prostitutes, lone mothers, beggars and drug addicts 
constituted the amorphous group labelled as the ‘underclass’. his lexible 
notion became a very useful tool for directing the fear and anger of the social 
masses towards those who could become perfect scapegoats and be 
blamed and punished for various, if not all, social problems. he American 
Dreamers could easily believe in the real threat they constituted to their 
safety and the obstacle they posed for the further development of the society 
and the economy. he most important characteristics of this stratum 
referred to a pathological predisposition toward delinquency, weak family 
ties, high frequency of divorces, lack of traditional values deining family roles 
and, above all, an attitude of entitlement towards the state and a corollary 
lack of motivation to work, which hampered economic growth 
and weakened the finances of the state due to welfare spending. 
he political consequences of this stigmatization are well recognized. 
he arguments proving the universal nature of the individual’s responsibility 
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for his or her fate were very important in building the capacity for the elitist 
consensus and the middle class indiference to the ‘Reaganomics’ 
in the eighties.
Loïc Wacquant (2009a, 2009b) points out the particularly inluential 
role played by conservative intellectuals in spreading anti-poor beliefs, 
negative attitudes regarding poverty, and promoting a strict penal policy 
in the American context through the tremendous work of think-tanks 
like the Heritage Foundation, CATO Institute, Manhattan Institute 
and RAND Corporation, paving the way for neoliberal solutions 
in the spheres of social policy retrenchment and the incarceration 
of poverty. Wacquant also elaborates on similar processes inluencing 
public attitudes and justifying pro-market reforms which have been 
visible in Western Europe since the nineteen-eighties. I argue that the same 
processes, but on even a larger scale, transpired in the reality of the trans- 
forming post-socialist societies, and that they had a huge impact on the newly- 
-emerging political scene, as well as the agenda of public discourse. At least 
in Poland, they did not meet any signiicant opposition in the intellectual 
elites and were hardly noticed in the international intellectual and scientiic 
circles.
East European pathway towards capitalism
Providing a short sketch of the well-recognized story from the other side 
of Atlantic seems important to establish a reference point from which to 
present the Polish case. he Polish intellectual elite, including scholars 
with a social studies’ background, once constituted the intelligentsia, 
a speciic social group possessing a unique ethos and playing a crucial 
role in reproducing Polish patriotism and Polish national values during 
the years of partition. he intelligentsia was perceived as a repository 
of national consciousness throughout the partitions of Poland, 
and subsequently under German occupation and Soviet dominance. his 
uniquely East-European social stratum was also characterized by a high 
level of concern for those at the bottom of social ladder, as well as 
for the well-being of ethnic or religious minorities. he unity of the society 
and the joint responsibility for the common good were among the crucial 
features of this ethos (see: Gella 1989; Zarycki 2009, 2003).
he fall of the communism and the transition to a market economy 
also marked the beginning of the end of this social group in its traditional 
form. As most of the social structure analysts have shown, Poland witnessed 
the birth of new strata in its post-socialist reality: the middle class. 
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Hanna Palska claims that the ethos of intelligentsia is in fundamental 
conlict with the ethos of middle class (2009). Proit-driven work 
and individualism replaces selless engagement in the public sphere 
and the sense of belonging to a wider community. Members of academia 
were among those who quickly became some the most determined 
success-oriented representatives of the new class. he economic transformation 
ofered an unprecedented opportunity for achievements, including 
in material terms. he huge sector of private tertiary education, with more 
than three hundred academies-enterprises, has been established by 
those who did not go to work in the business sector, policy-making or, 
in the case of social scientists, in the polling and marketing industry. 
his constituted a massive change after the years of lagging economically 
behind the communist nomenklatura and sometimes even behind 
the working class elite. During the last decade of Polish People’s Republic 
university graduates, even though scarce in number, were earning just 
14% more than the national average, while a signiicant share of population 
with primary education were earning only 10% below the mean income 
(Domański 2002).3 he beginning of the transformation was a real 
success story for academia, with the most rapid growth of tertiary enrolment 
in Europe and a blooming sector of private tertiary education. Education 
was seen as a “truly universal remedy for most of the negative efects of rapid 
social change. he more educated one is the quicker and more eiciently 
one adjusts to the new rules of life” (Czapiński 1996, 299).
his diferentiation of social structure in Poland, conditioned on access 
to high-quality education, has been growing (see: Słomczyński 2007). 
Even if salaries were not on the upswing in all professions requiring 
tertiary education (e.g. teachers in public elementary and secondary 
schools remained underpaid), the relationship between educational 
attainment and the success is ever more visible, with level of education 
being the crucial stratiier diferentiating inancial opportunities within 
the population. In 1982 the average diference between the earnings 
3   However, it has to be noted that already at the twilight of the supposedly 
classless People’s Republic of Poland, in 1988, the level of income inequalities in Poland 
as measured by Gini coeicient was at 0.28, equalling or exceeding inequalities in many 
capitalist states, for example in the Benelux countries, West Germany and Nordic 
states. Since then it has been growing steadily and since 2005 it has been at a level 
of 0.4 (Domański 2007, 312). his data comes from the Polish General Social Survey 
(part of International Social Survey Programme). Inequality as measured by oicial 
statistics was slightly lower, and since the peak (0.345) in 2005 decreased until 2009 
(0.336) thanks to a variety of factors (e.g. due to mass post-accession migration 
and the large inlow of post-accession structural EU funds). In subsequent years it has 
grown up to 0.342, see: Szarfenberg 2012.
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of those with a tertiary and those with a secondary education was at a level 
of 13.3%; in 2005 it was more than 61% (Domański 2007, 310). 
So, it is not without the reason that the economic transformation 
at the beginning of nineteen-nineties was positively acclaimed by most 
of the academic spheres, with some prominent igures heralding the beginning 
of a new order. It is also understandable that the only public igure enjoying 
unanimous respect in Palska’s study on the “winners of transformation” 
is Leszek Balcerowicz (Palska 2009, 256–257), the founding father 
of the neoliberal direction of the reforms. he debate about potential 
alternatives was weak and the very notion of capitalism was associated 
with its Anglo-Saxon model, without paying much if any attention to 
the other traditions of economic and social arrangements.
It is quite meaningful that the most powerful critical accounts 
of the outcomes of the transformations have been provided by foreign 
authors, i.e. David Ost, Elizabeth Dunn and Jane Hardy. Contrary to Polish 
scholars they do not refrain from taking a critical approach and using Marxist 
vocabulary to describe the processes of marginalization of the former 
allies of the elite – the working class (Ost 2005; Dunn 2004; Hardy 
2009).4 hey have pointed out the social and economic hardships 
experienced by the “losers of the transformation”.
As an anti-communist opposition, members of intelligentsia were 
once cooperating with workers creating the Solidarność movement 
and surviving the oppressions of martial law, which was introduced to 
defeat the largest social movement on the Eastern side of the iron curtain. 
he radically pro-market pathway of economic transformation was agreed 
upon jointly by the representatives of these two social groups when they 
constituted the irst Polish post-war parliament elected in partially free 
4   It is also quite evocative that all these authors were not avoiding the use 
of various applications of a Marxist approach to analysis of the social transformation. 
he reluctance of Polish scholars towards this way of conceptualizing social reality 
dates back to the period of the People’s Republic of Poland. Erik Olin Wright recapi-
tulates his experiences during his discussions with Polish sociologists who criticized 
his neo-Marxist approach: “What is the issue here is a dramatic diference in the contexts 
for pursuing radical intellectual work. In the Polish context of 1986, to declare that 
this was a reconstruction of Marxism meant something utterly diferent from what 
the same words mean when they are declared in the context of American sociology. 
In Poland, to reconstruct Marxism in the 1980s was to salvage an ideology of state 
repression. In the United States, to embed one’s work in a rhetoric of reconstructing 
Marxism means, in contrast, to declare one’s solidarity with struggles against capitalism, 
class inequality and oppression” (Wright 2005, 335). While the oppressive regime 
has vanished, Marxist accounts remain rare. Possibly the “solidarity with struggles 
against capitalism” is not considered as a virtue by Polish social researchers.
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elections in June 1989 (Kowalik 2009; Kieżun 2013). Nevertheless, 
the costs of market reforms were not equally distributed in the society 
and the rapid impoverishment of certain sectors of society took place, 
together with a sky-rocketing unemployment level that quickly exceeded 
20%, which mainly attributable to the rapid deindustrialization of some 
sectors of the Polish economy. Workers, who represented the largest 
share of members of Solidarity movement, quickly experienced the bitter 
taste of freedom.
Similar discursive processes to those used to justify the rapidly growing 
inequalities during the Reagan and hatcher era became part of the Polish 
reality. he most interesting part of this process refers to the way in which 
the elites, including those in academic circles, addressed those who did 
not beneit from the process of transformation, who were not able to 
endanger the privileged position nor high status of the elites, but could 
easily change the political situation in the country via the ballot box, 
i.e. making use of their recently regained voting rights. Former allies 
in a struggle towards an oppressive regime, these groups suddenly became 
a burden on the society and a constraint on even quicker pro-market 
reforms. Adding insult to an injury, the new elite was very quick to 
stigmatize and blame the victims, i.e. those who paid the highest price 
for the transition to the market economy, pointing out their deiciencies 
and general backwardness.
his way of justifying the Polish transformation was similar to what 
happened in America. And it impacted the works of Polish scholars, who 
helped create the speciic negative public image of those who did not make 
it to the top, or even to the middle of the social ladder (for an analysis 
referring to Polish press discourse on these social problems, see: 
Woźniak 2013, 2012; Pluciński 2010; Sowa 2010; Rek 2007; Rokicka 
and Warzywoda-Kruszyńska 2006, Chmielewska and Żukowski 2006, 
Szumlewicz 2006; Klebaniuk 2004; Podemski 2013).
hus, the ‘debate’ on the aims and objectives of social policy, which 
should address the issue of selection of particular modes or types of welfare 
regimes, has been completely absent, or at least present only in among 
a narrow academic circle of scholars specializing in social policy. In the general 
public debate over the idea of retrenchment from a generous and allegedly 
paternalistic socialist welfare state has been halted, a fact which is presented 
as part of the wider process of retrenchment from bankrupting welfare 
states, and a phenomenon which is occurring also in Western Europe. 
his happened despite the fact that during the Round Table Talks which 
ignited the process of peaceful transformation, the socially responsible 
way of transforming the economy in accordance with the principles 
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of a social market economy was agreed upon. Tadeusz Kowalik, advisor 
of the Solidarity movement, recalls a report prepared in the beginning 
of the year 1989 by the prominent Polish economists which positively 
assessed the possibility of implementing the Scandinavian model of economic 
and welfare arrangements in Poland (2009, 110–113). However, 
the decision-making was very quickly delegated almost exclusively to Leszek 
Balcerowicz and his closest allies, Jefrey Sachs and David Lipton. he debate 
was over and the pathway of transformation was chosen.
Homo Sovieticus. Underclass à la Polonaise
If “underclass” was the term used to help create the image of a certain 
social group among the American public, Homo Sovieticus played a similar 
role in Polish circumstances. he following subchapters attempt to point 
out the most speciic features of the discursive use, and misuse, of this 
term. It had been coined by Alexander Zinovyev, but in Poland it was 
popularized by Józef Tischner. He used the term Homo Sovieticus in his 
articles describing his regret and disappointment with the results of the irst 
free presidential election (see: Zinovyev 1986; Bonowicz 2003, 422-427; 
Tischner 1992). During the irst-round balloting, Stan Tymiński, 
a re-émigré and complete newcomer in Polish politics and unknown 
businessman from Canada making bold promises, managed to defeat 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, one of the most respected intellectuals; a member 
of anti-communist opposition and the irst non-communist Prime Minister.
Homo Sovieticus became very popular term during the forthcoming 
years, both in academic articles as well as in public debate. he usage made 
of this notion and its most coherent conceptualization and contextualiza-
tion has been provided by Piotr Sztompka, one of the most inluential Polish 
scholars and an internationally recognized sociologist. In Sztompka’s 
work, the crucial term describing speciic features of the Homo Sovieticus 
mindset is “civilizational incompetence.” his term covers a wide range 
of mental characteristics which did not allow him/her (i.e. the Homo 
Sovieticus) to fully legitimize the state of afairs in Polish society which 
resulted in their political choices. Among the most prominent of these 
characteristics Sztompka lists the support of egalitarianism and ‘disin-
terested envy’ of the more aluent or successful, an acceptance of state 
paternalism, anti-elitism, and anti-intellectualism; an example of the latter is 
the opportunistic adoption of double standards, camoulage in mediocrity, 
and the common or even institutionalized practice of evading rules imposed 
by the regime, with insubordination treated as a virtue (Sztompka 2001, 22).
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Aronof and Kubik, recent critics of the concept of Homo sovieticus, 
underline that for Sztompka, people afected with this defect constitute 
a burden on society, being a constraint on modernization and transition 
to a real market democracy. hus it follows that getting rid of this cultural 
syndrome is a central task for the elites in a post-communist society – 
“a prerequisite, a necessary condition for attaining true modernity: 
authentic democracy, a functioning market and open society” (Sztompka 
1993, 91; Aronof and Kubik 2013, 254).
Sztompka claims, without presenting any empirical evidence whatso- 
ever, that the aforementioned egalitarianism was: “directly shaped by 
communist propaganda and indoctrination” (Sztompka 2008, 137). He 
underlines, that Polish people:
were not equally afected by the syndrome of Homo Sovieticus. here were 
intellectual, academic, artistic or opposition elites – cosmopolitan and Western-
oriented – who were able to insulate themselves against the syndrome and already 
under communism embraced, in their imaginations, dreams and aspirations, 
the standards and values of the ‘free world’. Such elites became the carriers of the new 
mentality, spreading it to their followers and emulators (Sztompka 2008, 45).
Sztompka acknowledges that there were structural factors unequally 
distributed among social groups, which inluenced their coping strategies. 
He states that “those who were ighting against the communist regime 
and safeguarded the victory of the revolution – and this means primarily 
the working class of huge industrial enterprises – feel cheated, as their 
lives have generally not improved, and for some have even become 
dramatically worse” (Sztompka 2008, 46).
However, he again postulates that their problems are located inside 
their mentality and caused by excessive expectations: “People experience 
relative deprivation when they believe that they are justiied in deserving 
more than they actually have” (Sztompka 2008, 46).
In most of his depictions of the transition period Sztompka is reluctant 
to employ any kind of empiricism, concentrating instead on his narrative. 
However, his description of the mythology of the “Polish Dream” that 
created the opportunities for all, or almost all, who were active enough 
and deserved their chance, is based on some empirical observations: 
“we have observed a true outburst of entrepreneurial activities, with 
millions (yes, millions) of small new irms started and some of them 
soon developing into serious enterprises” (Sztompka 2008, 48). Yet, these 
observations were not nuanced with the commonly accessible knowledge 
that the mass increase in number of enterprises was and still is strictly 
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related to the process of rapid deindustrialization which commenced 
in Poland in the beginning of the nineteen-nineties, and which lead to 
mass unemployment. he actual collapse of the industrial sector lasted 
for a signiicantly shorter period of time than the deindustrialization 
which took place in the Western Europe in earlier decades. According to 
the estimations by Henryk Domański, between the years 1991 and 1993 
half of the newly established businesses were started up by former 
workers, among which 44% by unskilled labourers who were simply 
striving to avoid the unemployment trap and pauperization.5 For some 
reason, the intelligentsia was not instilled with the entrepreneurial spirit, 
as only 7% of the new entrepreneurs came from this group (Domański 
2007, 295–299). Soon they become even more privileged and distanced 
in economic terms from the rest of the population, and also became 
even more vocal in praising meritocracy. Another distinguished Polish 
professor of sociology and Rector of one of the most prestigious Polish 
private universities states, in his textbook Sociology of public life, that: 
“Social inequalities are justiiable, if an essential condition is fulilled, 
namely ‘outcomes’ are proportional to ‘inputs’”. he author continues 
by drawing a distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian states, 
where merits are valued arbitrarily, and market economies where 
the valuation is decided fairly, that is by the market itself (Wnuk-Lipiński 
2005, 63). As Michael Walzer put it: “Meritocracy, or the career open to 
talents, is the principle of those who claim to be talented: they are most 
often the monopolists of education” (Walzer 1983, 12).
his kind of pro-market eudaemonia comes back in references to 
the “wise shock therapy” of Leszek Balcerowicz, as it was described 
by one of Palska’s informants (Palska 2009, 53). he “Balcerowicz plan” 
and its social consequences are nowadays criticized for neoliberal orthodoxy, 
leaving aside the issues of the increase in poverty and signiicant growth 
of social inequalities. his critical assessment is provided not only by 
political activists and critics of neoliberalism like Naomi Klein (2007), 
or distinguished Polish economists (Kowalik 2009; Kołodko 2011, 2009), 
5   Another “outburst of entrepreneurial activities” was noted between 2002 
and 2004, when the number of enterprises doubled. However this was not caused 
by the spirit of capitalism suddenly descending upon the Polish population, but due 
to the liberalization of the labour code, which permitted employers to outsource 
employees from permanent contracts to the sector of self-employment, allowing 
companies to cut down expenditures for social and health insurance. he change 
of the status from employee to those self-employed who registered as the owners 
of newly established companies was strictly formal in nature and applied to a large 
number of workers from diverse occupational categories.
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but also by those who were once the closest political and ideological allies 
of Balcerowicz, like Jefrey Sachs, who dares to admit that the shock 
therapy had its unexpected and dramatic consequences for a signiicant 
share of the society (Żakowski 2009).
An interesting critique of the way in which Sztompka and others 
presented their argumentation was provided by the anthropologist 
Michał Buchowski. Drawing on Edward Said’s conceptual framework 
of “the Orient”, “the Occident” and “the Other”, Buchowski shows how 
the discursive strategies used by intellectuals supporting the neoliberal 
transformation of society created a social image of “the Others” – 
in this case the poor people, those sufering from the changes, burdened 
the civilized part of the society with the legacy of their soviet mentality. 
He points at phenomena which strengthen the symbolic and moral 
dominance of the “civilizationally competent winners of transformation.” 
He pays special attention to the usage of such semantic strategies 
by intellectuals with high academic and public position. Buchowski 
also quotes some very deinite public statements by Jan Winiecki, 
a distinguished professor of economics:
he only group whose situation has worsened in absolute terms (and not 
in relation to other groups) is constituted by employees of former state-owned 
farms. hey are doing bad, because they never learned how to work and after 
the liquidation of these ineicient establishments, they are not able to steal 
any more (quoted in: Buchowski 2006, 467).
his opinion refers to the situation of more than four hundred thousand 
low-qualiied agricultural workers who lost their jobs overnight at the turn 
of the years 1992 and 1993 due to the political decision which treated all state 
farms the same way, regardless of their economic standing and/or prospects 
for the future. Altogether this decision afected approximately two 
million people, counting their families. Since that time they have lived 
on the fringes of society, in most deprived rural areas of Poland, 
with unemployment levels exceeding 30%, and without any kind 
of the structural support which has been ofered in at least some sectors 
of industry. he only beneit they were provided with was the possibility 
to buy out the lats or houses formerly belonging to the farms. his act 
of charity wound up creating even worse conditions for the unemployed 
by limiting their spatial mobility. hey were unwilling and/or unable 
to sell the only possession they had and take the risk of starting life again 
somewhere else, and thus became “chained” to their local, and ever 
more deprived and deteriorating, communities. he conventional 
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wisdom, after almost two decades still frequently repeated in the media 
and whatever public debate exists, refers to the collapse of the former 
state farms as a result of their economic inefectiveness, overlooking 
the real story behind the process (Kowalik 2009).
Buchowski also elaborates on Sztompka’s concept of “civilizational 
competence”, illustrating the derogatory terms which are used to describe 
the victims of transformation, not only agricultural but also industrial 
workers as well. hey are not only incompetent and lacking in social 
skills. hey are also a burden on society because of their moral weakness. 
hey represent a speciic combination of characteristics. heir unpro-
ductive passivity is linked with an insolent and demanding attitude. 
heir voluntarily acquired helplessness is accompanied by an immoral 
resourcefulness by which they use loopholes in the social assistance 
schemes to take advantage of the state. As Buchowski summarizes: “they 
are not people with problems but themselves are the problem” (2006, 
468). he sufering and deprivation of a signiicant share of Polish society 
were not caused by any structural factors, but supposedly by the speciic 
state of their minds and souls.
This kind of diagnosis, formulated by distinguished scholars 
in academic works and replicated thousands of times in the media, 
iniltrates the attitudes of the public, which becomes saturated with 
certain clichés, useful and easy to handle, ofering not only justiications 
for state of the afairs in the society, but also providing self-conidence 
and satisfaction with belonging to the ‘better of’ part of society. Not only 
the mass-media, but also academic textbook, among them the most 
popular Polish sociology textbook (Sztompka 2003), contain these kinds 
of accounts, often hidden behind the façade of objective and axiologically 
neutral, scientific reflections. This also provides good grounds 
for and consensus among those in power, legitimizing the welfare retren- 
chment and further liberalization of economy in the name of minimizing 
state’s expenditure on the undeserving strata of society. he position of those 
at the top is well-deserved, as they are fulilling most of the meritocratic 
criteria, which are not being met by the undeserving Homines Sovietici.
he fundamental critique of these clichés comes from Zsuzsa Ferge. 
She points out value-laden and highly normative premises of the Homo 
Sovieticus used as a key-term to describe the insuicient moral and civi-
lizational competence of certain spheres (the poor) of East-European 
societies. he authoress notes that the supposed primitive egalitarianism 
and demanding attitude towards the state, or learned helplessness 
of those relying on state welfare, are classical labels used by the critics 
of the welfare state everywhere. Even leaving aside the argument that 
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these are commonly accepted and treated as ideologically-indiferent 
universal truths in Eastern Europe, and not the voices in pluralist 
and public debates, it must be noted that the basis for such assumptions 
has very weak empirical roots. Blanket statements about the lack 
of self-reliance caused by communism ignore the historical evidence 
that socio-psychological characteristics of large social groups result 
from their historical heritage and are not limited just to several decades 
of Soviet dominance. Contrary to Sztompka, who refrains from using 
any empirical evidence, Ferge elaborates on a rich amount of data to claim 
that, from the point of view of the modern welfare state analysis, 
“the socialist paternalist state is a legend and even after several decades 
of state socialism, the ‘communist’ social protection system never approached 
Western standards” (Ferge 2008, 144). During the “golden age of the welfare 
state” which lasted for several post-war decades, the level and quality 
of social protection available to the labour force in Western states was 
incomparably better to that available in the East, regardless of the oicial 
policy of full employment, the oicial declarations on the eradication 
of poverty, or the oicially announced high esteem for the working class. 
he economy of permanent shortage was not covering the needs of families 
and individuals in any way that could be compared to the standard 
of living accessible to workers in Western countries. his very fact, 
which is acknowledged by many economists as central to their criticism 
of the ineiciency of centrally-planned economies, is purposely omitted 
when blaming the generous and paternalistic socialist welfare state 
for making people helpless, passive and demanding. hus, the main 
arguments regarding reasons for the development of the allegedly speciic 
East-European mentality under the socialism does not comply with the well- 
-known features of the everyday life during this period. Ferge observes:
Learned helplessness seems to be a convenient myth and prolonged infantilism 
a malevolent one. People had to have many skills to organize everyday life under 
conditions of a shortage economy, and to do it on a shoestring. Moreover, 
people had to cope with countless problems on their own because the welfare 
system was defective and rigid. (…) hey had to cope on their own without 
public help, social work, market solutions, or supportive civil organizations 
(Ferge 2008, 145).
As Ferge proves on the basis of numerous comparative pan-European 
surveys, egalitarian attitudes and assumptions about the role of the state 
presented by Eastern Europeans do not vary substantially from those 
presented by their Western counterparts, who grew up and lived 
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the healthy and ‘civilizationally favourable’ circumstances of capitalism.
Plenty of statements legitimizing the constraints on economic 
growth posed by those at the bottom of the social ladder can be found 
in a book containing a dialogue between distinguished scholars, Piotr 
Sztompka and Andrzej K. Koźmiński, professor of management 
and founder and owner of the best private university in Poland. he book 
is titled: Dialogue about the great transition. Koźmiński identiies the most 
important shortcomings of the mentality of Poles in the following way:
We would like to have a state which takes care of us, but also which could 
be tricked by us. Half of the disability pensions are wangled for bribes. Only 
nobody knows which half that is. he same is true of sick-leaves; probably half 
of them are wangled. Today people do not take sick-leaves so easily, because 
they are afraid of getting sacked. But cheating is still commonly accepted. (...) 
Is it true that only the rigorous conditions of the free market and strict controls 
can change this state of mind? It is no surprise that people are against them. 
he most grotesque are the protests and blockades of taxi drivers against the law 
forcing them to install cash registers in their cars. hey are simply defending 
their right to commit swindles (Koźmiński and Sztompka 2003, 44).
he failures of the Polish economy are explained here through the mental 
characteristics of individuals. heir defects justify the need for strong 
control over the labour force. No empirical evidence has ever been provided 
for the accusations against the beneit recipients. Still this kind of argumen-
tation is very common in public discourse in Poland, neglecting the fact 
that the growth in the number of disability pensions and early retirement 
pensions resulted from a conscious policy of the state at the beginning 
of the transition aimed, at slowing down the further growth of the anyway 
sky-rocketing unemployment. Tadeusz Kowalik used the term “neoliberal 
welfare state” to label this way of “counteracting” the rise in unemployment 
(2010).
he issue of “grotesque” taxi drivers’ protests is also presented without 
contextualization. hey were protesting also against unequal treatment 
by the newly introduced legislation. hey were made to install cash 
registers to prevent them from ‘swindles’ related to avoidance of paying 
Value Added Tax. According to the same regulation, services provided 
by members of newly-established middle class were exempted from this 
kind of regulation after their successful (and not “grotesque”) lobbying 
in parliament. Private legal chambers or medical clinics do not have to 
fulil that kind of obligation, which was considered by the protesters 
as being against the rule of equality before the law. On the other hand, 
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the way it has been presented is in accordance with the presumption that 
civilizationally competent and well-educated individuals are immune to 
the Homo Sovieticus syndrome that makes ‘others’ act immorally. George 
Homans labelled the functional theory of stratiication as an attempt to 
refute Marx by proving that the proletariat had no intellectual or moral 
right to demand its money or life (Romero and Margolis 2005, 1). Some 
Polish scholars add their eforts to this task. his also brings to mind 
the statement of the Montagu Collet Norman, the director of the Bank 
of England during the inter-war period, cited also by Buchowski in the above-
-mentioned article. Referring to Polish competence in economic afairs, 
Norman stated that “it is the misfortune of Poland that she is populated 
by the Poles” (quoted in: Buchowski 2006, 479). It seems that at least 
part of the circle of Polish intellectuals share that sentiment. However, 
the ‘misfortune’ refers here only to a certain strata of the society, which 
in consequence experiences a secondary victimization.
The poor under attack – notes from the ieldwork
he relection and/or result of this kind of discourse was observed by 
sociologists from the University of Łódź, who during the years 2004–
2007 carried out the international comparative project called Policy 
Responses Overcoming Factors in the Intergenerational Transmission 
of Inequalities (PROFIT) – for published results referring to this article’s 
theme see: Warzywoda-Kruszyńska et al. 2006, 2007; Woźniak 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c, 2010).6 he main research topic was the issue of interge-
nerational transmission of inequalities and the potential policy impact of this 
process. Various groups of professionals who could contribute to the policy- 
-making and/or policy implementation were approached by the researchers. 
Interviews were conducted with members of the parliament working 
in the Committee for Social Afairs, representatives of local public admin- 
istration, local councillors, managers from welfare services institutions, 
voluntary workers from NGOs, as well as the so-called ‘frontliners’ – 
social workers, probation oicers, employment counsellors, and teachers – 
those who in their every day job deal with people afected by poverty, 
unemployment and various resulting social deicits.
6   PROFIT (Policy Responses Overcoming Factors In the Intergenerational 
Inheritance of Inequalities, CIT2-CT-2004-506245) was an international research 
project inanced under the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission, 
realized in eight European countries and coordinated by the University of Lodz. More 
information at: http://www.proit.uni.lodz.pl/.
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It can be assumed that politicians, although representing diferent 
political orientations, are immersed in the discourse which is dominant 
in a given country and legitimized by speciic values and norms (especially 
those who operate only on the national level, i.e. are not involved 
in the debates in the European parliament or are without experience 
in supranational bodies). he semantic strategies mentioned above 
and the phraseology which addresses poor people and their problems are 
relected numerous times in the transcripts of interviews. he speciic 
language code used when talking about welfare recipients is undoubtedly, 
at least to some extent, an outcome of the way these issues are addressed 
in the public debate. he most common semantic constructs found 
in the statements of the respondents referring to the poor were: passivity, 
lack of productivity, lack of skills indispensable to accommodate the new 
social conditions, demanding attitude, learned helplessness, welfare 
dependency, pathology and demoralization, anti-social behaviour, 
immoral resourcefulness. Many respondents perceived the reasons 
behind the economic situation of the welfare recipients as resulting 
from individual, psychological and moral characteristics, and not 
in structural terms. his also refers to the employees of social services 
who themselves, due to their low wages, belong to the group of working 
poor. he modernization and progress of the country is therefore seriously 
hampered by those at the bottom who cannot adjust to the new conditions 
and follow the new rules.
When referring to the state’s responsibility for the dependents’ fate, 
structural conditions were rarely addressed and the “blame the victim” 
strategy and secondary victimization of the poor was visible and argu-
ments from the public debate were easily recognizable.
he children afected by poverty, since they could not be blamed for 
their fate, constituted the only group of deserving poor, apart from disabled 
people. At the same time they were perceived as endangered by infection with 
the social diseases spread by their parents. In accordance with the frequently 
misinterpreted concept of “culture of poverty”, they are supposed to replicate 
all the negative characteristics of their families of origin.
In some cases even the determinist reasoning, referring to an inborn 
and unavoidable transmission of some Homo Sovieticus gene was 
mentioned in this context. he economic and cultural processes taking 
place in Poland over the past two-plus decades were usually presented 
as the drivers enhancing motivation, activity and entrepreneurship 
of the “healthy” part of the society, creating opportunities and conditions 
for a prosperous life for all. Accordingly to this way of thinking, 
it was individual characteristics and defects that did not allow the poor 
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in society to realize the “Polish Dream”, and not related to structural 
circumstances. his kind of attitude towards the members of the lower 
strata is connected with the stigmatization processes occurring in the media 
and – at least to some extent – justiied and legitimized by social scientists. 
None of the respondents from neither the central or neither local levels 
of government ever mentioned the civic rights which are supposed to be 
guaranteed to all citizens by the constitution. All expenditures for the pur- 
poses of supporting the poor were treated rather as a form of charity.
Any hope of realizing a coherent and cohesive policy has also been 
hampered by strictly political reasons. Respondents from all spectrums 
of the political scene acknowledged that children, young people and large 
families are among the groups mostly endangered by the poverty 
and inequality. However, as openly stated by one of the MPs participating 
in the research:
And certainly children and youth are groups which are pushed out from the public 
discourse. When we speak about political criteria, the fact that half 
of the population below the age of 19 lives below the poverty line cannot get 
into the politicians’ consciousness. hey are not aware that this group, according 
to all studies and researches, are mostly endangered by poverty and that special 
actions aimed on equalizing their life opportunities should be introduced. (…) 
All these factors are absent in political decisions and I assume that this is so 
for reasons. Children and the youth simply do not vote.7
Not only children do not vote, but also their parents living in deprived 
areas of Poland rarely make it to the ballot-box, contributing to 
the lowest voter turnout in European Union. On the other hand, the most 
disciplined group of voters is formed by the elder generation, mainly 
pensioners. Hence, most of actions in the ield of social policy, as well 
as the messages during electoral campaigns, are aimed at this age group, 
even though the data from EU-SILC shows that in 2006, the chances 
of falling below the poverty line were more than three times lower 
for people aged 65 and over (8%) compared to the age group 0-17 years 
(26%). According to data from Eurostat in 2006, 7% of the retired 
population was at risk of poverty, compared to 45% of the unemployed 
and 18% of those in employment (European Commission 2009, 2010).
It needs to be underlined that all major political parties white at the oice 
were unanimous in supporting the way of thinking about transformation 
of economy and social policy as sketched above. he diferences were 
7   All quotations come from the transcripts of interviews conducted by 
the author during the course of PROFIT project. 
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visible in declarations, particularly in electoral campaigns. During 
the realization of the PROFIT project researchers faced opinions varying 
from the strictly neoliberal declarations supported by the Civic Platform 
the party which is ruling in Poland since 2007. MP from this party 
shared the views that: “the state should just not disturb. he state should 
stand back, especially from the economic ield. Only liberalization 
of economy and the labour code can lead to the economic growth, which 
is the only panacea for unemployment and poverty.”
Elaborating on the features of socialist times inherited by Polish 
economy and minds:
I believe that the next generations, starting from the sense of competition 
at schools – for example external examinations serve this purpose and lots of other 
things – they will somehow understand that enterprises are nor for them to 
work there, instead they are to produce something and they and people must 
adjust to this. Such is the psychological diference between the market economy 
and this real socialism. And the whole generation which is still coming out 
of real socialism are not able to understand this.
he neoliberal pathway of transition was followed by the Democratic Left 
Alliance which while in oice (2001–2005) continued implementation 
of pro-market economy and iscal policy during their term, contributing 
to the aforementioned liberalization of the labour code and introducing 
the lat rate taxation for companies (reducing the rate from 28 to 19 percent).
he most coherent visions in favour of the social justice were formu-
lated by the members of Law and Justice, party ruled by Lech and Jarosław 
Kaczyński, twin brothers. One of the other leaders of this party while asked 
in an interview about inequality reproduction and state’s responsibility answered:
Inequality inheritance is like a vicious circle. It is a chain of impossibilities. 
To break free from it one must do it alone or with the help of somebody else. 
his may be the state, some external organization. here is a kind of outstanding 
individuals who are lucky, but it is a cultural phenomenon of some sort, a social 
phenomenon, that the state must notice the problem, intervene, direct some 
(…), it must take pliers and cut that chain, it must help these people out.
He stated also that the dominance of neoliberal ideas supported also by 
the post-communist was to blame for the state of afairs: 
unfortunately the position of the labour unions is very weak in Poland, they 
aren’t a strong partner among these three. Enterprisers are perfectly organized, 
they have confederations, they have money, they have opinions, they have 
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something to show, logistic infrastructure, and unions are fading, which is 
dramatic. (…) And the social policy goes through all sort of twists and turns 
and though we have a leftist government, the policy is ultra or deinitely liberal, 
antisocial, anti-human, a real comedy.
he post-communist vs. post-Solidarity axis of political conlict was 
replaced in the year 2005 by the argument between “Solidarity Poland” 
represented by Law and Justice declaring themselves as the protectors 
of ordinary people and victims of transformation against “the liberal 
Poland” of Civic Platform whose leaders envisaged the need for further 
pro-market reforms. Law and Justice came to the rule winning 
the election in the late 2005. heir triumph was doubled with the win 
of Lech Kaczyński in a presidential race. Kaczyński himself member 
of the Solidarity movement imprisoned by the communists during 
the Martial Law in 1981 and professor of the labour law, deined himself 
as a conservative politician with socialist views on the economy. Nevertheless, 
after winning the election the party nominated for the position of Prime 
Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz who during his irst interview in the oice 
when inquired about the social model that inspires his most declared: 
“I was most impressed by London. And what was achieved in Great 
Britain thanks to Margaret hatcher” (Żakowski 2005). When asked about 
the intellectuals whom are most respected by him, he mentioned two 
names: Francis Fukuyama and Milton Friedman. After this kind of decla- 
ration it was not surprising that among the crucial decisions of Law 
and Justice government in a field of economy were: abolishment 
of inheritance tax regardless of the assets of the deceased, decreasing 
of personal income taxation in favour of those at the top (two rates: 18% 
and 32% instead of three: 19%, 30% and 40%) and reduction of the social 
insurance contributions both for the employer and employees.
Summary
he ‘winners of transformation’, those who succeeded thanks to their 
educational attainment and professional status, have become very active 
in defending the meritocratic way of stratifying society. Meritocracy 
is another example of a word which has changed its meaning overtime. 
Bitter relections on this can be found in the last works of Michael Young, 
who coined the term half a century ago in his dystopian novel “Rise 
of Meritocracy” (1953). Maybe unanimous support for the chosen path 
of transition and acceptance for the growing inequalities could be to 
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some extent explained via statements of Young:
In the new social environment, the rich and the powerful have been doing 
mighty well for themselves. hey have been freed from the old kinds of criticism 
from people who had to be listened to. (…) If meritocrats believe, as more 
and more of them are encouraged to, that their advancement comes from their 
own merits, they can feel they deserve whatever they can get. hey can be 
insuferably smug, much more so than the people who knew they had achieved 
advancement not on their own merit but because they were, as somebody’s son 
or daughter, the beneiciaries of nepotism. he newcomers can actually believe 
they have morality on their side (Young 2001).
It seems that the topic of the social responsibility of the elites has van- 
ished from the public sphere in Poland, at least partially because the new 
elites, policy-makers, media and intellectuals who set up the agenda have 
deined the topic as meaningless. Among the reasons of the state of afairs 
which has been described above, one can note the substantive weaknesses 
of public media, which is involved in political conlict and it treated 
as another political institution dominated by the ruling party. he private 
media, on the other hand, mainly belongs to foreign corporations which 
follow a strictly pro-market way of thinking, promoting and support- 
ing solutions beneicial for business lobbies. he role of intellectual 
and academic circles in sustaining consensus over what is and what is 
not an important topic on the agenda should not be overlooked either. 
It seems that the public debate in Poland has to a large extent mimicked 
what happened in the United States during the triumphant years 
of neo-conservatism. his can also be observed in other ields of the public 
debate which are outside the framework of this paper, such as penal 
policy, foreign policy regarding the war on terror, prioritizing spending 
on the military sector, and others.
A couple of years ago one of the Polish sociologists involved 
in studying the social consequences of transition and presenting 
the results of research on diaries documenting the dramatic situation 
and life strategies of poor and unemployed was accused of performing 
“lamentable sociology” by another distinguished professor of sociology 
(Rek 2007, 366). Michael Burawoy, in one of his addresses urging the public 
involvement of sociologists issued an appeal: “Sociologists must come 
out of the shells, the shells into which they retreated when the market 
euphoria was raging around them” (Burawoy 2009, 198). It seems that 
for Polish social scientists the choice was threefold: whether to lament, 
to retreat, or to enthusiastically praise the new order.
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